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Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by Rosemary T. Cakmis*

and
James T. Skuthan*"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Compared to the previous two years, the Eleventh Circuit issued
relatively few published opinions relating to the United States Sentenc-

ing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") during 2000.'

This decline could be the

result of fewer guidelines cases being presented to the Eleventh Circuit
or more guideline cases being disposed of in unpublished opinions.2 An
equally likely explanation, however, may be that the court has been
inundated with cases involving the application of the landmark United
States Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey. Courts
across the nation have been grappling with the ripple effects of the
potentially far reaching applications of Apprendi.4
This Article

* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Chief of Appellate Division, Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division. University of Florida (B.S., 1979; J.D., 1981). Member, The
Florida Bar; United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida; Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
** Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Orlando
Division. Auburn University (B.A., 1980); Florida State University (J.D., 1985). Member,
The Florida Bar; United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida; Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998) [hereinafter "U.S.S.G."].
2. The Eleventh Circuit issues numerous unpublished decisions in criminal cases each
term. However, these cases are not accessible through computer assisted legal research,
such as Westlaw or Lexis.
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi the Supreme Court held, "[oither than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 484. This holding has been applied to numerous federal statutes, including 21 U.S.C.
§ 841. See infra Part IV.B.2.
4. From June 26, 2000 (when Apprendi was decided) through the end of 2000, almost
200 federal district and circuit court opinions were reported that cited Apprendi. Also, in
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discusses some of those applications, including the effect of Apprendi on
the guidelines in general,5 on drug quantity calculations under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1,6 and on the career offender guideline.'
The published guidelines cases that the Eleventh Circuit considered
in 2000 address the applicability of the guidelines,' relevant conduct
calculations,' and the scope of resentencing based on retroactive
guideline amendments."
The court also reviewed the guidelines
applicable to various offenses, such as robbery, drugs, racketeering
influenced in corrupt organizations (RICO), pornography, voter fraud,
firearms, immigration, and money laundering." In contrast to recent
years, the cases involving the robbery guidelines 12 far outnumbered the
cases 3involving other guideline provisions, including the drug guidelines.'

The court also interpreted some of the guideline adjustments, such as
the defendant's role in the offense, 4 abuse of a position of trust,'
obstruction of justice," acceptance of responsibility, 7 and the safety
valve. 8 Although the court only dealt with the criminal history
chapter of the guidelines in a few cases, it issued some significant
decisions regarding criminal history calculations 9 and the career
offender enhancement. 2' The court dealt with fewer departure cases
than in prior years. Nonetheless, the court followed the general trend
established in recent years by affirming upward departures, reversing
downward departures, and affirming district court decisions not to
depart downward. 2' Additionally, the court rendered several decisions

2000, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision below, and remanded 23
cases for further consideration in light of Apprendi. Five of these cases were from the

Eleventh Circuit.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2000).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.
U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1, 2B3.1
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (2000).
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (2000).
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (2000).

See infra Part VI.B.

(2000). See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.

16. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2000). See infra Part V.C.
17. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (2000). See infra Part V.E.
18. U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(6), 5C1.2 (2000). See infra Part VII.A.
19. U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2 (2000). See infra Part IV.A.
20. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2000). See infra Part VI.B.
21. See infra Part VII.C.
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23
relating to sentencing procedures 22 and plea agreements, and guide24
line calculations in cases involving supervised release violations.

II.

APPLICABILITY OF THE GUIDELINES

Before addressing the cases in which the Eleventh Circuit applied
specific guidelines, it is important to note two cases in which the
Eleventh Circuit stated that the sentencing guidelines are not applicable. United States v. Nealy 21 involved the application of Apprendi in a
drug case. Prior to deciding Nealy, the Eleventh Circuit held, in United
States v. Rogers,26 that "drug quantity in [21 U.S.C.] section 841(b)(1)(A) and section 84 1(b)(1)(B) cases must be charged in the indictment and
27
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Apprendi."
However, in Nealy the court noted that the sentencing guidelines are not
subject to the Apprendi rule."8 Thus, the district court can consider
relevant conduct to determine overall drug quantity in calculating the
base offense level, even if the drug quantity involved in the relevant
conduct is not pled in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial.2 9
In United States v. Chavez,30 the court noted that the offense of
assault by striking, beating, or wounding within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,3" which carries a maximum penalty of six
2
months imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, is a Class B misdemeanor.
The court then held that "[slentences for Class B misdemeanors, such as
the charged offense, are not subject to the Sentencing Guidelines and
will not be disturbed on appeal unless 'they were imposed in violation of
as by exceeding statutory limits) or are plainly unreasonlaw (such
33
able.' "

22. See infra Part VIII.A.
23. See infra Part VIII.B.
24. See infra Parts VII.B. and IX.
25. 232 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2000).
26. 228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000).
27. Id. at 1327. Rogers is discussed in more detail in connection with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
infra Part II.C.2., and the career offender enhancement, infra Part II.E.2.
28. 232 F.3d at 829 n.3.
29. Id.
30. 204 F.3d 1305, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2000).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4) (1994).
32. The Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that the offense was a
petty offense, which did not entitle defendant to a jury trial. 204 F.3d at 1310.
33. Id. (quoting United States v. Bichsel, 156 F.3d 1148, 1151 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotes omitted)).
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL APPLICATION
PRINCIPLES

A. U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)-Relevant Conduct (Reasonably
ForeseeableActs of Others)
In addition to being accountable for one's own acts, U.S.S.G. section
1B 1.3(a)(1)(B) holds defendants liable for "all reasonably foreseeable acts
and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction,
in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense."34 As more fully discussed
under the robbery guidelines section of this Article,35 section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) was applied to hold a defendant liable for his accomplice's acts of
carjacking and kidnapping in United States v. Cover.36
In Cover the district court found that the carjacking and kidnapping
were reasonably foreseeable to defendant. 37 The district court reasoned
that "pretty much anything that happens" when a defendant robs a bank
.with firearms and with other people intending to do whatever is
necessary to effect that robbery" is reasonably foreseeable to all the
defendants.3" In finding that this reasoning was "sound," the Eleventh
Circuit rejected defendant's argument that his accomplice's carjacking
and kidnapping were not foreseeable to him because he "had brought his
car to the bank to be used as the getaway car."39 The court explained
that "[tihe fact that the co-conspirators agreed to a plan that did not
involve carjacking or abduction does not preclude the district court from
finding that cayjacking and abduction were reasonably foreseeable if 'the
original plan went awry' and the police became involved."4 The court
noted that "an act is reasonably foreseeable if it is 'a necessary or
natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.'"4 1

34. U.S.S.G. § 181.3(a)(1)(B).
35. See infra Part IV.A.3.
36. 199 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000).
37. Id. at 1274.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1274-75.
40. Id. at 1275 (quoting United States v. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (2d Cir.
1997)).
41. Id. (quoting Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648 (1946)). See also United
States v. Martinez, 924 F.2d 209, 210 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991).
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B. U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.10-Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as
a Result of Amended Guideline Range
In United States v. Bravo,42 the Eleventh Circuit discussed the scope
of the district court's authority in resentencing a defendant based on a
retroactive sentencing guideline amendment.43
This decision is
important in light of the substantial guideline amendments that took
effect in 2000. 44 In Bravo defendant was initially sentenced in 1993 for
conspiracy to import cocaine. 45 The guidelines in effect at the time
applied base offense level 40 for such offenses involving 897 kilograms
of cocaine. 46 Thereafter, U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1 was amended to lower
the base offense level from 40 to 38 for offenses involving more than 150
kilograms of cocaine 4 7 Under U.S.S.G. section 1B1.10(c), this amendment was made retroactive. Additionally, after defendant was sentenced, Congress enacted the safety valve statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).48
The safety valve statute was incorporated into U.S.S.G. section 5C1.2
but was not made retroactive.49
Based on the retroactive amendment to section 2D 1.1, defendant filed
a motion for a sentence adjustment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).so Defendant also requested application of the newly enacted safety
valve provision and a downward departure based on his extraordinary

42. 203 F.3d 778 (l1th Cir. 2000).
43. Id. at 779.
44. Sentencing guideline amendments 591 through 607 took effect November 1, 2000.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2000). Also, an "emergency"
amendment, Amendment 590, took effect May 1, 2000. Id. These amendments affect
several guideline provisions. Amendments 591, 599, and 606 are retroactive. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(c) (2000).
45. 203 F.3d at 779.
46. Id. After three levels were deducted for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1(a), defendant's total offense level was 37.
47. U.S.S.G. § 1201.1 (1995).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994 & Supp. 1999).

49. See U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.10(c) (2000).
50. Section 3582(c)(2) provides:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except
that ...

in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of

imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered
by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), . . . the court may
reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (1994).
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medical condition that developed while he was incarcerated."' The
district court reduced defendant's sentence based on the retroactive
amendment to section 2D1.1 but found that it lacked jurisdiction to
depart downward or to apply the safety valve.52
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the two-part analysis that
must be applied in reducing a sentence under section 3582(c)(2).
"Initially, the court must recalculate the sentence under the amended
guidelines, first determining a new base level by substituting the
amended guideline range for the originally applied guideline range, and
then using that new base level to determine what ultimate sentence it
would have imposed."53 In recalculating the guidelines, the commentary to U.S.S.G. section 1B1.10(b) only allows for the sentence to be
reduced based on the amended guideline, and requires that "all other
guideline application decisions [made during the original sentencing]
remain unaffected."54 The court then noted that "[tihe next step is for
the court to decide whether, in its discretion, it will elect to impose the
newly calculated sentence under the amended guidelines or retain the
original sentence. This decision should be made in light of the factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."5 5 A defendant's need for medical care is
51. 203 F.3d at 780. Defendant developed renal failure and was placed on dialysis in
a prison medical center. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) cmt. n.2 (2000).
55. 203 F.3d at 781. Section 3553(a) provides:

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.-The court shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes
set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the
particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, and that are in effect
on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable
guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
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one such factor, which the district court specifically considered in
deciding to reduce defendant's sentence from 210 months to 168 months
imprisonment."
However, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to depart downward based on defendant's medical
condition. 7 The court emphasized that a sentencing adjustment under
section 3582(c)(2) is not a de novo resentencing.5" Rather, other than
the application of the amended guideline range, "all original sentencing
determinations remain unchanged."5 9 The only exception to this rule
is that a downward departure from the original guideline range need not
be reapplied to the amended guideline range because "a discretionary
decision to permit a downward departure from the original guideline
range 'is not a guideline application decision that remains intact when
the court considers the new Guideline range.'"60 The court declined to
reach the question of whether, when resentencing a defendant under
section 3582(c), the district court should also apply the safety valve
statute if that statute was enacted after the original sentence. 1 The
court noted that the safety valve statute only applies when the
guidelines range is less than the statutory mandatory minimum. 2
Because defendant's revised sentence was greater than the statutory
mandatory minimum, the safety valve statute was not applicable.6 3
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held that section 3582(c) does not
confer jurisdiction on the district court "to consider extraneous resentencing issues," such as an Eighth Amendment challenge to the sentence. 4

section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2) that is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994).
56. 203 F.3d at 781.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 781 n.5 (quoting United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 761 (l1th Cir. 1998))
(internal quotes omitted). Thus, in resentencing a defendant under section 3582(c), the
district court need not re-impose a substantial assistance departure that had been applied
at the original sentencing hearing. Id.
61. Id. at 781.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 781-82.
64. Id. at 782.
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Instead, such a challenge must be raised in a collateral attack on the
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.65
IV. CHAPTER Two: OFFENSE CONDUCT

A.

Part B: Robbery, Extortion, and Blackmail

1.
U.S.S.G. Section 2B1.1(b)(4)(A)-More Than Minimal
Planning. Under U.S.S.G. section 2B1.1(b)(4)(A), a two-level enhancement applies in robbery cases if the offense involves "more than minimal
planning."66 The commentary to U.S.S.G. section 1BI.1 explains that
more than minimal planning involves "more planning than is typical for
commission of the offense in a simple form." 7 More than minimal
planning is present when the defendant commits "repeated acts over a
period of time," except when the acts were clearly "opportune."" It
may also be found when the defendant takes "significant affirmative
steps" to conceal the offense.69
In United States v. Ward,7" the court found that defendant's actions
surrounding his two thefts warranted this enhancement.7 ' Defendant
planned his second theft in advance and took affirmative steps to conceal
the offense.72 Additionally, the court noted that "[a]lthough the
commission of two thefts may not constitute 'repeated acts' and thereby
be sufficient by itself to justify a more than minimal planning enhancement, the fact that [defendant]
committed two thefts does weigh in favor
73
of the enhancement."

2. U.S.S.G. Section 2B3.1(b)(2)-Weapon Enhancements. In
several cases, the Eleventh Circuit addressed enhancements that apply
if a "firearm" or a "dangerous weapon" is involved in the commission of
the robbery. U.S.S.G. section 2B3.1(b) provides for increasing levels of
enhancements depending on the type of weapon used and the manner in
which the weapon is used.74 Under section 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), four levels

65. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994).
66. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4)(A) (2000).
67. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(f).
68. Id.

69. Id.
70. 222 F.3d 909 (11th Cir. 2000).
71.

Id. at 910.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 911.
74. Section 2B3.1(b)(2) provides:
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are added if a dangerous weapon is "otherwise used," and under section
2B3.1(b)(2)(E), three levels are added if the dangerous weapon is
"brandished, displayed, or possessed."75 The four-level enhancement for
otherwise using a dangerous weapon was applied in United States v.
Miller.76 Defendant in that case approached a bank teller, displayed
two red sticks with a fuse, which "looked like a bomb," lit the fuse, asked
the teller if she knew what the object was, and demanded money. When
defendant was apprehended, law enforcement realized the object was
inert. 7
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the appeal presented a question of
first impression for the court: "whether a four-level sentence enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3. 1(b)(2)(D) may be applied for 'otherwise
us[ing]' an object which appeared to be a 'dangerous weapon' during the
commission of an attempted robbery."78 The court noted that the
commentary to the guidelines specifically includes "an object that
appeared to be a dangerous weapon" in the definition of a dangerous
weapon in the context of the three-level enhancement for brandishing,
displaying, or possessing a dangerous weapon. 79 The court saw no
reason for a dangerous weapon to be interpreted differently for purposes
of the four-level enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon. o Thus, the court interpreted section 2B3.1(b)(2) "to treat uniformly
objects appearing to be dangerous weapons as if they actually were
dangerous weapons for sentence enhancement purposes, thereby
maintaining the integrity of a substantive difference between section
2B3.1(b)(2)(D) and section 2B3.1(b)(2)(E)."8 1 The court then concluded
that defendant otherwise used a dangerous weapon when "he actually
lit the fuse of the fake bomb while explicitly threatening the bank

(A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (B) if a firearm was
otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was brandished, displayed,
or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (D) if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used,
increase by 4 levels; (E) if a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or
possessed, increase by 3 levels; or (F) if a threat of death was made, increase by
2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2) (2000).
75. The definitions for these terms are found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(g) ("otherwise

used"), and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(c) ("brandished").
76. 206 F.3d 1051, 1052 (11th Cir. 2000).
77. Id. Because defendant did not object to the enhancement at sentencing, the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed his challenge to the four-level enhancement "only for plain error
to avoid manifest injustice." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) cmt. n.2.
80. 206 F.3d at 1053.
81. Id.
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teller."8 2 This conduct, much like "the cocking of a handgun," was more
than mere brandishing, and constituted otherwise using the dangerous
weapon under section 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). 8 3 Accordingly, the four-level
enhancement was affirmed. 4
In United States v. Bates,8 5 the district court applied a three-level
enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon during the commission of a robbery.8" Although defendant had no weapon during the
robbery, the teller thought he did because he reached into the waistband
area of his pants with his hand, "clearly implying and simulating the
presence of a weapon." v The Eleventh Circuit referred to the commentary to section 2B3. 1(b)(2)(E), which provides that "[wihen an object that
appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or
possessed, treat the object as a dangerous weapon for the purposes of
subsection (b)(2)(E)."85 The Eleventh Circuit then noted that the
"critical factor" in applying this enhancement "is whether the defendant
intended the appearance of a dangerous weapon."" The court found
that simulating possession of "what appearedto be a dangerous weapon"
had the same potentially dangerous consequences as possession of a toy
gun or an unloaded gun.9 ° "If someone detects a toy gun, he may react
to it with deadly force.""1 Thus, the court affirmed the imposition of
the three-level enhancement "[b]ecause [defendant's] hand simulated
possession of what appeared to be a dangerous weapon, and 9the
victim
2
teller perceived [defendant] to possess a dangerous weapon."
In so ruling, the majority in Bates rejected defendant's argument that
the two-level enhancement found in section 2B3. 1(b)(2)(F) applied

82. Id. at 1054.

83. Id.
84. Id.

85. 213 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2000).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1337.
88. Id. at 1337; U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 cmt. n.2.
89. 213 F.3d at 1338.
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id. (citing United States v. Shores, 966 F.2d 1383, 1387 (11th Cir. 1992)
("possession of a toy gun, just as an unloaded gun, is considered possession of a dangerous
weapon because of its potential to be dangerous")). See also United States v. Vincent, 121
F.3d 1451, 1452, 1455 (11th Cir. 1997) (section 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) enhancement applies when
the "victim of a robbery was intimidated by the placing of a hidden object in her side," even

though the victim did not see the object); United States v. Woods, 127 F.3d 990, 993 (11th
Cir. 1997) (enhancement was based on the victim's perception that the defendant possessed
a gun).
92. 213 F.3d at 1339.
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because his actions constituted only a threat to the teller.9 3 Defendant
argued that by placing his hand in his pants, he was gesturing, as
referenced in the commentary to that guideline.94 However, the
majority stated that the type of "gesturing" contemplated in section
2B3.1(b)(2)(F) "in no way simulates the possession of a dangerous
weapon as required under subsection (E)." 9" One judge dissented on
this point.96 In expressing the view that section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) applied
to defendant's conduct, the dissent stated that section 2B3. 1(b)(2)(E) and
the cases interpreting it "require the presence of some object that can be
perceived as a weapon." 9 The dissent then explained that, contrary to
the majority opinion, the enhancement should be based on "an objective
assessment of the evidence associated with the defendant," rather than
"the subjective belief of the victim." 98
In United States v. Cover,99 the district court enhanced defendant's
base offense level under U.S.S.G. section 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) for brandishing,
displaying, or possessing a firearm during a robbery. 100 On appeal the
government asserted that U.S.S.G. section 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) should have
been applied because the firearms were "otherwise used," not merely
"brandished, displayed, or possessed" during the robbery.' 0 ' The court
referred to the guideline commentary that defines "otherwise used" as
"conduct [that did] not amount to the discharge of a firearm but was
more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other
dangerous weapon. " 10 2

The commentary defines "brandished" as

pointing or waiving a weapon or displaying it in a threatening manner.10 3 The Eleventh Circuit found that "the use of a firearm to make
an explicit or implicit threat against a specific person constitutes

93. Id. at 1337.
94. Id. at 1339 n.1.
95. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 cmt. n.6).
96. Id. at 1340-41 (Bechtle, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1341.
98. Id. at 1342.
99. 199 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2000).
100. Id. at 1272. Although defendant was also convicted and sentenced for using a
firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the firearm enhancement for the robbery conviction based on the co-conspirators'
possession of firearms during the robbery. Id. at 1278. This aspect of Cover and the recent
guideline amendment that effectively overrules it are discussed in the section of this Article
that addresses Chapter Two, Part K, and U.S.S.G. § 2M2.4 (2000). See infra Part VI.F.
101. 199 F.3d at 1278 (quoting U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(B)- (C) (1999)).
102. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(g) (1998)).
103. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.l(c)). See also U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 cmt. n.1
(1998) (referring to section 1B1.1 commentary in defining "otherwise used" and
"brandishing").
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'otherwise use' of the firearm.""° The court then held that "the action
of the unidentified co-conspirator in carjacking and abducting a motorist
at gunpoint is sufficient to constitute 'otherwise use' of his firearm." °5
Thus, the five-level enhancement was reversed, and the case was
of the six-level enhancement under section
remanded for application
06
2B3. 1(b)(2)(B).'
3. U.S.S.G. Section 2B3.1(b)(5)-Carjacking Enhancement. All
three judges in Bates agreed that the district court properly applied an
enhancement for carjacking during the commission of a robbery under
U.S.S.G. section 2B3.1(b)(5). 10 7 Defendant argued that the guideline
commentary, which does not require specific intent, is inconsistent with
the carjacking statute,108 which was amended to add specific intent as
an element.'0 9 Thus, defendant argued that the "commentary lacks
authority because it is inconsistent with the federal statute.""0
The Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to resolve this conflict
between the statute and the guideline for two reasons. First, the court
stated that if the United States Sentencing Commission had intended
the guideline definition to mirror the statute, it would have amended the
guideline."' Second, the court noted that defendant had not been
charged under the carjacking statute.' 2 Rather, he was charged with
bank robbery, and his sentence was enhanced for attempting a
Thus, the court decided it was
carjacking during the robbery."'
required under the guideline
intent
was
irrelevant whether specific

104. 199 F.3d at 1278.
105. Id. at 1279.

106. Id.
107. 213 F.3d at 1339-40.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
109. Id. at 1339. Based on the carjacking statute that was enacted in 1992, U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1(b)(5) cmt. n.1, defines carjacking as the "taking or attempted taking of a motor
vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation."
The carjacking statute was amended in 1994 by adding the language "with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm." Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60003(a)(14), 108 Stat. 1796, 1970 (1994). The guideline
definition of carjacking has not been amended to reflect the specific intent requirement of
the statute. 213 F.3d at 1339.
110. 213 F.3d at 1339 (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (holding
"that commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with,
or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline")).
111. Id. at 1340.
112. Id.

113. Id.
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"because the facts support both the guidelines definition and the
statutory definition of carjacking." n4
In Cover the district court enhanced defendant's sentence under
U.S.S.G. sections 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) and 2B3.1(b)(5) based on the carjacking
and kidnapping committed by an accomplice who escaped." 5 As
discussed in the relevant conduct section of this Article," 6 the district
court found that the carjacking and kidnapping were reasonably
foreseeable to defendant in accordance with U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)." 7 The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendant's argument that the
carjacking and kidnapping were not reasonably foreseeable to him
because he "had brought his car to the bank to be used as the getaway
car."" ' The court explained that "[tihe fact that the co-conspirators
agreed to a plan that did not involve carjacking or abduction does not
preclude the district court from finding that carjacking and abduction
were reasonably foreseeable if 'the original plan went awry' and the
Thus, the enhancements were afpolice became
involved."" 9
20
firmed.

4. U.S.S.G. Section 2B3.1(b)(7)-Amount of Loss. U.S.S.G.
section 2B3.1(b)(7) applies various levels of enhancements for robbery
offenses based on the amount of loss incurred by the victim. In Cover
the court applied section 2B3.1(b)(7)(C) because it determined the
amount of loss was more than $50,000 but less than $250,000.121 The
district court arrived at the amount of loss based on $12,740 retrieved
from the conspirator who escaped and an estimated $100,000 that
remained in the bank vault after the attempted
22 robbery. Defendant
challenged this amount of loss on two grounds.
First, defendant argued that the district court erred by including
money that remained in the bank vault and was not taken by the

114. Id. The facts underlying the enhancement were that, after the robbery, defendant
ran onto the porch of a residence, demanded the keys of the person sitting on the porch,
grabbed the person by the arm, and forced him inside the house to get his car keys. When
the person pulled a gun on defendant, defendant fled. Id. at 1337. The court found that
these facts established that defendant attempted to take the person's car by force and
violence or by intimidation. Id. at 1340.
115. 199 F.3d at 1274.
116. See supra Part III.A.
117. 199 F.3d at 1274.
118. Id. at 1275.
119. Id.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 1275-76.
122. Id.
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robbers."i The Eleventh Circuit rejected this challenge, stating that
under section 2X1.1,
a defendant who partially completed an offense (i.e., only seized part
of the money) will be held liable for the entire offense (i.e., the entire
amount of money that the defendant attempted to seize) if "the
substantive offense was substantially completed or was interrupted or
by the intercession of law
prevented on the verge of completion
1 24
enforcement authorities or the victim."

The Eleventh Circuit noted that the testimony showed defendant
"entered the bank vault area with the two tellers who had the key and
the vault's combination."' 25 However, defendant left the vault area
before the key was inserted into the lock or the combination was entered
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
because the police arrived on the scene.'
found that the funds remaining in the bank vault were properly included
in the loss calculation because defendant "had completed all of the
necessary acts to seize the funds in the bank vault and that, but for the
intervention of the police, he would have successfully seized those
funds." 27
Second, defendant argued the evidence concerning how much money
was in the vault was "too speculative." 128 The Eleventh Circuit relied
on the guideline commentary that provides, "the loss need not be determined with precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate
of the loss, given the available information." 129 Here, the bank manager testified that the minimum amount of money contained in the bank
vault at the time of the robbery was $100,000. iso This was sufficient
to affirm the application of section 2B3.1(b)(7)(C).''
B.

Part D: Drug Offenses

1. U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1)-Firearm Enhancement. In
United States v. Cooper,3 2 a two-level enhancement was applied,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1(b)(1), for possession of a firearm

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 1275 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 cmt. n.4 (1998)).
Id. at 1276.
Id.
Id.

128. Id. at 1275.
129. Id. at 1276 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (1998)).

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 203 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2000).
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during a drug offense. Defendant challenged this enhancement by
arguing that the government had not demonstrated the firearm belonged
to him."' a The Eleventh Circuit rejected this challenge, stating that
even if the firearm belonged to the co-conspirator, it was found in a
motel room over which both co-conspirators had equal dominion.'34
Defendant also argued that the government did not prove the gun was
actually connected to the drug offense.'35 However, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that under the commentary to section 2D1. 1, the enhancement "should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense."' 36 The
Eleventh Circuit stated the fact the weapon in this case was found in a
motel room under packaged marijuana suggested "an active connection
with the narcotics enterprise that [defendant] does not credibly
138
rebut."'3 7 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the enhancement.
2. U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(c)-Drug Quantity Calculations. For
sentencing purposes in drug cases, drug quantity is the single most
important factor. It significantly impacts the guidelines, as well as the
statutory penalties. The statutory scheme of 21 U.S.C. § 841139
essentially creates separate offenses for crimes involving different
amounts of various drugs, each under a separate subparagraph. 4"
Until the Supreme Court decided Apprendi on June 26, 2000, the
133.
134.

Id. at 1286.
Id.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 1287 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.3 (1997)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
140. For example, the penalties for offenses involving cocaine base are as follows:

Subparagraph

Triggering

Maximum

Mandatory

Supervised

Amount of

Imprisonment

Minimum

Release

Life

10 years

5 years

Cocaine Base
§ 841(b)(1)(A)

50 grams
or more

§ 841(b)(1)(B)

more than
5 grams

40 years

5years

4 years

§ 841(b)(1)(C)

anything not

20 years

none

3 years

covered by

(A)or (B)
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Eleventh Circuit clearly held that drug quantity was a sentencing factor,
not an element of the offense, even though the statutory maximum
under section 841 depends on the amount of drugs involved in the
offense. 141
In United States v.Hester,42 the defendant was convicted on five
counts relating to the production and sale of marijuana. The district
court imposed a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence, which
significantly exceeded the guideline range of imprisonment.
At
defendant's first sentencing hearing, the district court held him
responsible for 2,924 marijuana plants. Under the version of U.S.S.G.
section 2D1.1(c)(4) in effect at that time, the district court equated 1
kilogram per plant, which resulted in a guideline range of 240 to 262
months imprisonment. The statutory mandatory minimum sentence set
forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) was twenty years for more than one
thousand plants, if the defendant had a prior conviction.
After
defendant was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment, the guideline was
amended. The amendment, which applies retroactively, changed the
weight calculation to one hundred grams per plant (or the actual weight
of the plant if higher), regardless of the number of plants involved.
Thereafter, defendant's conviction was affirmed, but his case was
remanded for resentencing in light of the guideline amendment. On
remand the district court noted that under the amendment, the
defendant's guideline range was 108 to 135 months imprisonment, but
the statutory
mandatory minimum remained at twenty years imprison43
ment. 1
In his second appeal, defendant challenged the imposition of the
mandatory minimum sentence on two grounds. First, he asserted that
the difference between the guideline range and the statutory mandatory
minimum violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States Constitution. 144 The court noted, "We need not determine Congress's justification for approving the Amendment; we need
only examine the decision to evaluate whether it rests on a rational
basis. " 145
The court then determined that Congress's action in

141. The Eleventh Circuit most recently affirmed this rule in United States v.Hester,
199 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000). In United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir.
2000), the Eleventh Circuit overruled Hester to the extent that it held drug quantity was
a sentencing factor, not an element of sections 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) offenses. Id. at 1327.

Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court vacated Hester and remanded for further
consideration in light of Apprendi. Hester v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 336 (2000).
142.
143.
144.

199 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1289.

145. Id. at 1290.
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approving the recalculation of marijuana plant weight for guidelines
purposes, but not for the statutory mandatory minimum purposes,
survives a rational basis review.146 The court also noted that when the
mandatory minimum exceeds the applicable guideline range, the
mandatory minimum becomes the guideline sentence under U.S.S.G.
section 5G1.1(b). 147 In rejecting defendant's equal protection argument, the court noted that "Congress must draw lines between classes
of "offenders
and that those lines might appear arbitrary at the edg14
es. 8
In Hester defendant also challenged his sentence by arguing that the
drug amount was an element of the offense that was not pled in the
indictment or proven at trial.1 49 The court rejected this argument,
holding that drug amount was a sentencing factor, not an element of the
offense.5 0 Therefore, defendant could be sentenced to the statutory
mandatory minimum under section 841(b)(1)(A).' 5 1
The United States Supreme Court vacated Hester and remanded for
further consideration in light of Apprendi.'5 2 Furthermore, in United
States v. Rogers,'53 the Eleventh Circuit overruled Hester to the extent
it held that drug quantity is a sentencing factor, not an element of an
offense charged under section 841(a).1 4 The court in Rogers held that
"drug quantity in section 841(b)(1)(A) and section 841(b)(1)(B) cases
must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt in light of Apprendi."'5 5 The court in Rogers then
vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the district court
for resentencing under section 841(b)(1)(C), which applies to cases in
which the indictment does not specify a quantity of drugs and the jury
verdict convicts the defendant of a drug offense involving an undetermined quantity of crack cocaine.' 6

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
offender

Id. See also United States v. Marshal, 95 F.3d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 1996).
199 F.3d at 1290 n.1.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1291-92.
Id. at 1293.
Hester v. United States, 121 S. Ct, 336 (2000).
228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1327 n.12. Rogers is discussed in more detail in connection with the career
guideline U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, infra Part VI.B.

156. 228 F.3d at 1329. In so doing, the court noted that the statutory maximum under
section 841(b)(1)(C) was twenty years imprisonment, even though defendant had prior drug
convictions. Id. Although section 841(b)(1)(C) allows for a thirty-year sentence of
imprisonment if the defendant has a prior drug conviction, that enhancement does not
automatically apply. As noted by the court in Rogers:
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The Eleventh Circuit discussed drug quantity calculations in a
different context in United States v. Simpson.16 v In Simpson the
district court attributed 857.7 grams of crack cocaine to defendant in
calculating his base offense level under U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1. Several
sources of information were relied on to establish this total amount of
drugs. On appeal defendant challenged three of the sources. 5 '
However, because he did not object in the district court, the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed his challenge only for plain error.'59
Defendant's first challenge concerned 600 grams of cocaine distributed
in 1992. The conspiracy charged in the indictment did not begin until
May 1996.'60 The Eleventh Circuit found that the 600 grams of
cocaine was improperly attributed to defendant for sentencing purposes
because it was the product of activity that "clearly falls outside the
scope
" 16
of the 1996 conspiracy for which [the defendant] was convicted. '
Next, defendant challenged 144 grams of cocaine attributed to him
based on a witness' "vague" testimony. The witness testified that he had
received quarter ounces of cocaine from defendant during an unknown
period. He also could not remember how long or how frequently these
distributions were made.' 62 The Eleventh Circuit found that the
district court erred in attributing 144 grams to defendant based on this
vague and ambiguous testimony. 1 3 Finally, defendant challenged 28
grams of cocaine base that he allegedly distributed in late 1995, which
was before the 1996 conspiracy began. The Government argued that

For a defendant's sentence to be enhanced under the provisions of section 841, the
government must meet the requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 851. Section 851 provides
that a recidivist enhancement may not be imposed for a jury conviction "unless
before trial .... the United States attorney files an information with the court
(and serves a copy of such information on the [defendant] or counsel for the
[defendant] ) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon." We
have consistently required strict compliance with the requirements of section 851.
Id. at 1328 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Rogers court stated that defendant was
not subject to the thirty-year sentence applicable under section 841(b)(1)(C) for defendants
with a prior conviction, because his sentence was not imposed in accordance with the
requirements of section 851. Id.
157. 228 F.3d 1294, 1300-02 (11th Cir. 2000).
158. Id. at 1300.
159. Id. at 1300-01. To establish plain error, a defendant must prove: (1) that an error
occurred, (2) that the error is plain, and (3) that the error affects the defendant's
substantial rights. Id. The courts have added a fourth criteria that requires correction of
plain error only if the error "seriously affects (the] fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings." Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
160. Id. at 1301.

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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these drugs were properly considered as relevant conduct because they
were sufficiently related to the conspiracy for which defendant was
convicted.'" 4 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the uncharged conducted
involved the "same parties as the charged conspiracy and was temporally
connected to it."' 65 Thus, the court concluded that "we cannot say the
district court erred, let alone plainly erred, or that it resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.""6
Because of the district court's erroneous drug quantity calculations,
the Eleventh Circuit found that defendant was entitled to a six-level
reduction, in his base offense level.' 67 However, as discussed in
connection with Chapter Five, Part K departures,'" defendant ended
up with a lengthier sentence because the court also reversed a downward
departure." 9
C. PartE: Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Offenses
Under U.S.S.G. section 2E1.1, the base offense level for offenses
involving racketeering influenced and corrupt organizations ("RICO") is
the greater of either nineteen or "the offense level applicable to the
underlying racketeering." 7 ° In United States v. Yeager,'7 ' the Eleventh Circuit addressed the proper method of applying a role enhancement in cases involving RICO offenses.' 72 Rather than discussing
Yeager under the section of this Article dealing with role enhancements, 7 3 it is discussed here because of its unique relevance to RICO
offenses.
In Yeager the district court grouped the underlying racketeering
activity into seven groups, one of which was drug offenses. The base
offense level for the drug offenses was greater than nineteen and greater
than the base offense level for the other six groups. Therefore, the court
applied the base offense level found for the drug offenses. The court
then added four levels for defendant's role in the offense under U.S.S.G.

164.

Id.

165. Id. at 1302.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1303. The Eleventh Circuit held defendant responsible for 113.7 grams of
crack cocaine, resulting in base offense level 32, instead of level 38, which the district court
applied based on 857.7 grams. Id. at 1303-04.
168. See infra Part VII.C.
169. 228 F.3d at 1305.
170. U.S.S.G § 2E.1(a)(2) (2000).
171. 210 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2000).
172. Id.
173. See infra Part V.A.
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section 3B1.1(a). On appeal defendant challenged the role enhancement,
arguing that although the evidence established he was a leader or
organizer of the overall RICO activity, the evidence did not establish
that he was a leader or organizer in the drug offenses. 7 4 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the role enhancement, finding that it had not been
applied based on defendant's role in the drug conspiracy.'75 Rather,
defendant's base offense level for the drug offenses, without consideration of the role enhancement, became defendant's base offense level for
the overall RICO conspiracy under section 2E1.1.17s Therefore, the
district court properly applied the role enhancement for defendant's role
in the overall RICO conspiracy to the base offense level for the RICO
offenses."7 7 In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit determined that "the
predicate-by-predicate approach of [U.S.S.G. section 2EL.1] applies...
only for the purpose of establishing a RICO defendant's base offense
level, and not for the purpose of applying the chapter 3 adjustments."'
D. Part G: Offenses Involving Prostitution,Sexual Exploitation of
Minors, and Obscenity
1. U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2. In United States v. Probel,'79 defendant was convicted of one count of transporting child pornography. On
appeal he challenged the five-level enhancement for distribution of child
pornography imposed pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 2G2.2(b)(2).'
In
a case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that
"pecuniary or other gain is not required for the enhancement to
apply."'' The Eleventh Circuit based its holding on the "plain lan-

174. 210 F.3d at 1315-17. The court applied base offense level 32 for the drug offenses
based on the amount of drugs involved, under U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1(c). The court then

added two levels for the specific offense characteristic of possessing a weapon during the
offense,
175.
176.
177.
178.

under
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1(b)(1). Id. at 1316.
1316-17.
1317.
1316 (quoting United States v. Damico, 99 F.3d 1431, 1438 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Thus, a defendant's role in the offense needs to be viewed with regard to the overall RICO
conspiracy, as opposed to being judged separately regarding each offense underlying the

RICO conviction. Id.
179. 214 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2000).
180. Id. at 1286.
181. Id. at 1288. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit sided with the Second, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and rejected the holding of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that
"pecuniary gain, albeit defined broadly, is required." Id. at 1290; see also United States v.
Lorge, 166 F.3d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Canada, 110 F.3d 260, 263 (5th
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guage of the Guidelines and the application notes." is2 However, on
November 1, 2000, those guidelines and application notes were amended
to clarify the interplay between distribution and pecuniary gain. The
amended guideline provides various levels of enhancements depending
on whether the distribution was for pecuniary gain, for a thing of value,
or for something else.' 83

Cir. 1997); United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Horn, 187 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 202 (7th Cir.
1997); United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999).
182. 214 F.3d at 1288. The court noted that section 2G2.2(b)(2) provides for an
increase in the guideline level corresponding to the retail value of the material if the
offense involved distribution. According to the Eleventh Circuit, "although the term
'distribution' is undefined," the commentary states that "'distribution' includes any act
related to distribution for pecuniary gain including production, transportation, and
possession with intent to distribute." Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1). The court
further noted that guideline commentary for general application principles provides that
"the term 'includes' is not exhaustive." Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.2). The court
then found that the enhancement applies not only to "defendants who distribute child
pornography," but also to defendants "who are indirectly involved in distribution for profit,
such as producers and transporters." Id. In giving this expansive reading to the guideline,
the Eleventh Circuit stated that the term "distribution" is to be "given its ordinary
meaning of 'to dispense' or 'to give out or deliver.'" Id. This "plain language" was found
to not limit distribution to cases in which the defendant received pecuniary or other gain.
Id. at 1289-90.
183. Amendment 592 amends U.S.S.G. section 2G2.2(b) by striking subdivision (2) in
its entirety and inserting the following:
(2) (Apply the Greatest) If the offense involved:
(A) Distribution for pecuniary gain, increase by the number of levels from the
table in § 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit) corresponding to the retail value of the
material, but by not less than 5 levels.
(B) Distribution for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but
not for pecuniary gain, increase by 5 levels.
(C) Distribution to a minor, increase by 5 levels.
(D) Distribution to a minor that was intended to persuade, induce, entice,
coerce, or facilitate the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct,
increase by 7 levels.
(E) Distribution other than distribution described in subdivisions (A) through
(D), increase by 2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b), amend. 592, app. C (2000).
Amendment 592 also amends the commentary to section 2G2.2 by striking Application
Note One in its entirety, and inserting, in pertinent part:
1. For purposes of this guideline "Distribution" means any act, including production, transportation, and
possession with intent to distribute, related to the transfer of material involving
the sexual exploitation of a minor.
"Distribution for pecuniary gain" means distribution for profit.
"Distribution for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but
not for pecuniary gain" means any transaction, including bartering or other in-
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In United States v. McIntosh," defendant pled guilty to nine counts
of interstate transportation of child pornography by computer.
Defendant appealed the district court's refusal to group the counts under
U.S.S.G. section 3D1.2(a) or (d).51
The Eleventh Circuit relied on
United States v. 7Tllmon 186 in rejecting the argument that grouping
was required under section 3D1.2(a) because the counts "involved the
same victim and the same act or transaction." 8 7 In Tillmon the
Eleventh Circuit held that for purposes of section 3D1.2, "the primary
identifiable victim of the transportation of child pornography is the
minor depicted in the image." 88 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that
defendant's "distribution of many pictures, involving different children,
victimized each child separately."'8 9
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court's decision to not
group under section 3D1.2(d), which requires grouping when "'the
offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense
Concerning the first
guideline is written to cover such behavior.""'
prong of the guideline, the Eleventh Circuit stated that although it had
"doubts that [defendant's] offense behavior was ongoing or continuous in
nature, we assume for present purposes that it was." 9 ' However,
regarding the second prong, the court held that section 2G2.2 was not
"written to cover trafficking in child pornography as an ongoing
offense."'92 The Eleventh Circuit noted that section 3D1.2(d) lists
certain offenses that are to be grouped and are not to be grouped under

kind transaction, that is conducted for a thing of value, but not for profit. "Thing
of value" means anything of valuable consideration. For example, in a case
involving the bartering of child pornographic material, the "thing of value" is the
child pornographic material received in exchange for other child pornographic
material bartered in consideration for the material received.
"Distribution to a minor" means the knowing distribution to an individual who
is a minor at the time of the offense, knowing or believing the individual is a
minor at that time ....
U.S.S.G. § 262.2, amend. 592, app. C. (2000).
184. 216 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2000). Although McIntosh interpreted the guideline for
grouping, U.S.S.G. section 3D1.2, it did so in the unique context of the child pornography
guideline. Therefore, it is appropriately discussed in connection with the child pornography
guideline, rather than the grouping guideline.
185. Id. at 1253.
186. 195 F.3d 640 (11th Cir. 1999).
187. 216 F.3d at 1253 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 301.2(a) (2000)).
188. Id. (quoting Tillmon, 195 F.3d at 645).
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 301.2(d) (2000)).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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that guideline. 19 3 Section 2G2.2(b)(4) is not listed under either category.19 4 The court then noted that section 2G2.2(b)(4) provides for a fivelevel increase "[if the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity
involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor."195 However, the
commentary specifically excludes trafficking from the definition of
"sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor."196 Thus, the court held that
the guidelines do not contemplate
grouping for such trafficking offense
197
under section 3D1.2(d).

19 defen2. U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.4. In United States v. Harper,
dant was convicted of possession of child pornography. His base offense
level was enhanced two levels under U.S.S.G. section 2G2.4(b)(2) for
possession of more than ten items depicting child pornography. The
enhancement was based on a computer zip diskette, which contained
between six hundred and one thousand different pictures of minors. The
pictures were in more than ten different files on the diskette.199
Section 2G2.4(b)(2) provides for a two-level enhancement if "the offense
involved possessing ten or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,

video tapes, or other items, . . . involving the sexual exploitation of a

minor." M Defendant argued that the diskette was like a book or a
magazine, which could contain many pictures, but was only counted as
one "item" under the guideline. 2 1 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
comparing the diskette to a library and the files contained thereon to
books.20 2 Thus, the court upheld the enhancement because "the
separate computer files on one computer disk count as discrete 'items'
under section 2G2.4(b)(2)." 2°3 This holding is consistent with the
guideline amendment that went into effect November 1, 2000. 0

193. Id. at 1254.

194. Id.

195. Id.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1 (2000)).
Id.
218 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1286.
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(b) (2000).
218 F.3d at 1287.

202.

Id. (citing United States v. Fellows, 157 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998)).

203. Id.
204. Amendment 592 adds the following to U.S.S.G. section 2G2.4 cmt. n.2 (2000):
For purposes of subsection (b)(2), a file that (A) contains a visual depiction; and
(B) is stored on a magnetic, optical, digital, other electronic, or other storage
medium or device, shall be considered to be one item.
If the offense involved a large number of visual depictions, an upward departure
may be warranted, regardless of whether subsection (b)(2) applies.
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E. Part H: Offenses Involving Individual Rights
In United States v. Smith,2 5 defendants were convicted on a number
of counts relating to violations of the absentee voter laws in an
election. 2" U.S.S.G. section 2H2.1 provides for various base offense
levels depending on the type of conduct involved in the offense.2"7 The
district court applied section 2H2.1(a)(2), which calls for base offense
level twelve "where forgery, fraud, theft, bribery, discrete, or other
means are used to affect the vote of another person, or the vote another
person was entitled to cast."20 ' The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendants' argument that the base offense level should have been six under
section 2H2.1(a)(3) because, according to the Eleventh Circuit, that
subsection "addresses an individual who acts unlawfully only with
respect to his own vote-an individual who accepts payment to vote,
gives false information to establish his own eligibility to vote, or votes
more than once in his own name."2" Because defendants' offenses
involved forging other voters' names on applications for absentee ballots
and affidavits of absentee voters, the court found that section 2H2. 1(a)(2)
applied.2 10
F

PartK: Offenses Involving Public Safety
In United States v. Fernandez,21' defendant was convicted of being
a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant's base offense level was
calculated under U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a)(2), which provides for level
twenty-four "if the defendant has 'at least two prior felony convictions

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4, amend. 592, app. C (2000).
205. 231 F.3d 800 (11th Cir. 2000).

206. Id. at 804.
207. Section 2H2.1 provides:
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greatest):
(1) 118, if the obstruction occurred by use of force or threat of force against

person(s) or property; or
(2) 12, if the obstruction occurred by forgery, fraud, theft, bribery, deceit, or
other means, except as provided in (3) below; or
(3) 6, if the defendant (A) solicited, demanded, accepted, or agreed to accept
anything of value to vote, refrain from voting, vote for or against a particular
candidate, or register to vote, (B) gave false information to establish eligibility to
vote, or (C) voted more than once in a federal election.
U.S.S.G. § 2H2.1 (2000).
208. 231 F.3d at 819 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2H2.1).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 234 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2000).

20011

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1445

of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.' 212 On
appeal defendant argued that one of his prior convictions, wherein he
pled nolo contendere and adjudication was withheld, did not qualify as
a conviction for purposes of section 2K2.1(a)(2).2 13 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed, reasoning that any conviction that results in a
criminal history point under U.S.S.G. section 4A1.1 counts as a
conviction under section 2K2.1(a)(2), as well. 214 A conviction based on
a plea of nolo contendere, when no adjudication of guilt is entered, is
counted for criminal history purposes under U.S.S.G. section 4A1.2(f).25 Thus, the court concluded that a plea of nolo contendere, when
adjudication is withheld, falls within the ambit of section 2K2.1(a)(2).218

In United States v. Jamieson,217 defendant was also convicted of
possession a firearm by a convicted felon. However, the district court
calculated his base offense level under U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a)(3), 215
which provides for level twenty-two "if the offense involved a firearm
described in ... 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30), and a defendant has one prior
felony conviction of either a crime of violence or controlled substance
offense." 21 9 Section 921(a)(30)(A)(i) describes semiautomatic assault
weapons, which include "Norinco, Mitchell, and Poly Technologies
Avtomat Kalashnikovs (all models)." 220

The evidence clearly estab-

212. Id. at 1346 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2. 1(a)(2) (2000)). The term "crime of violence"
is defined in U.S.S.G. section 4B1.2(a). The term "controlled substance offense" is defined
in U.S.S.G. section 4B1.2(b) (2000).
213. Id. at 1346-47.
214. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) cmt. n.5).
215. Id. at 1346.
216. Id. at 1347-48.
217. 202 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2000).
218. Id. at 1295.
219. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3) (2000).
220. Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30) (1994), a "semiautomatic assault weapon" is defined
as one of the nine specified firearms listed in section 921(a)(30)(A) or as a semiautomatic
rifle that meets the requirements listed in section 921(a)(30)(B). Section 921(a)(30)(A)
provides:
The term "semiautomatic assault weapon" means (A) any of the firearms, or copies or duplicates of the firearms in any caliber,
known as -

(i) Norinco, Mitchell, and Poly Technologies Avtomat Kalashnikovs (all models);
(ii) Action Arms Israeli Military Industries UZI and Galil;
(iii) Beretta Ar70 (SC-70);
(iv) Colt AR-15;
(v) Fabrique National FN/FAL, FN/LAR, and FNC;
(vi) SWD M-10, M-11, M-11/9, M-12;
(vii) Steyr AUG;
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lished that defendant's firearm, which was manufactured by Norinco,
was not an illegal semiautomatic assault weapon. 221 Nonetheless, the
district court concluded that all Norinco weapons fall within the ambit
of section 921(a)(30).2 2 2 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that
section 921(a)(30)(A)(i) only bans certain types of Norinco weapons, such
as Norinco Avtomat Kalashnikovs. 2" Defendant's firearm was not
such a weapon.224 Additionally, the court noted that section 921(a)-

(30)(B) "only includes semiautomatic weapons, regardless of make, which
display two or more proscribed characteristics." 225 Defendant's weapon

did not display such characteristics. Therefore, section 2K2. 1(a)(3) could
not be applied.226
In Cover the district court enhanced defendant's robbery guidelines,
under U.S.S.G. section 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), for brandishing, displaying, or
possessing a firearm during a bank robbery. 227 Defendant challenged
this enhancement on appeal based on U.S.S.G. section 2M2.4 because he
was also convicted and sentenced for using a firearm in connection with
a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 228 The commentary to
section 2K2.4, which pertains to section 924(c) convictions, states:
"Where a sentence under this section is imposed in conjunction with a
sentence for an underlying offense, any specific offense characteristic for
the possession, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm (e.g.,
§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(F) (Robbery)) is not to be applied in respect to the
guideline for the underlying offense."229
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred by enhancing
defendant's sentence based solely on his possession and use of the
However,
firearm that was punished by the section 924(c) sentence.
basis for
an
alternative
the court found the error was harmless because
23
enhancement existed. ' The court explained that "[wihile § 2M2.4

(viii) INTRATEC TEC-9, TEC-DC9 and TEC-22; and
(ix) revolving cylinder shotguns, such as (or similar to) the Street Sweeper and
Striker 12.
Id. § 921(a)(30)(A)(i)-(ix).
221. 202 F.3d at 1295.
222. ld.
223. Id. at 1295-96.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1297.
226. Id.
227. 199 F.3d at 1273.
228. Id. at 1276-77. Because defendant did not raise this objection in the district court,
it was reviewed for plain error on appeal. Id. at 1277.
229. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n.2 (2000).
230. 199 F.3d at 1277.
231. Id.
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does bar double counting, it does not bar 'enhancement for a separate
weapons possession, such as that of a co-conspirator' where the
defendant was convicted and sentenced for his own possession or use of
a firearm."1 2 Because defendant's co-conspirators possessed firearms

during the robbery, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the section 2B3.1(b)(2)
enhancement. 3 3
On November 1, 2000, the guidelines were amended to preclude this
result. 2'

The commentary to section 2K2.4 now specifically provides

that no weapon enhancement may be applied to the underlying offense
guideline if "a co-defendant, as part of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity, possessed a firearm different from the one for which the
defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)."235 The amendment
has been made retroactive. 3 ' Ergo, any defendant who previously
received an enhanced sentence pursuant to section 2B3.1(b)(2) under
these circumstances may be eligible for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582.237

232. Id. at 1277-78 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 65 F.3d 932, 933 (11th Cir.
1995)).
233. Id. at 1277.
234. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, amend. 599, app. C (2000). Amendment 599 adds, in part, the
following commentary to section 2K2.4:
If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for
an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for
possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm when
determining the sentence for the underlying offense. A sentence under this
guideline accounts for any explosive or weapon enhancement for the underlying
offense of conviction, including any such enhancement that would apply based on
conduct for which the defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).
Do not apply any weapon enhancement in the guideline for the underlying offense,
for example, if (A) a co-defendant, as part of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity, possessed a firearm different from the one for which the defendant was
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); or (B) in an ongoing drug trafficking offense,
the defendant possessed a firearm other than the one for which the defendant was
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). However, if a defendant is convicted of two
armed bank robberies, but is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in connection with
only one of the robberies, a weapon enhancement would apply to the bank robbery
which was not the basis for the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction.
Id.
235. U.S.S.G. § 2M2.4 cmt. n.2 (2000).
236. See id. § 1Bl.10(c).
237. See discussion under the section of this Article addressing U.S.S.G. section 1B 1.10,
supra Part IV.B.
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G. Part L: Offenses Involving Immigration, Naturalization,and
Passports
U.S.S.G. section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) applies a sixteen-level enhancement for
a defendant who has been deported and illegally re-enters the United
States following a criminal conviction for an aggravated felony.2"
Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) and (G), "aggravated felonies" include
crimes of violence and theft offenses "for which the term of imprisonment
at least one year [sic]."213 A footnote in the statute indicates that the
word "is" should probably be inserted in the quoted language so the
statute0would read "for which the term of imprisonment is at least one
24
year."
In United States v. Maldonado-Ramirez,24' defendant argued that
the statute is ambiguous because of the missing language, and that the
definition could apply to sentences imposed or sentences served. 42
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the statute,
other provisions within section 1101(a), and case law from other
2 43
The court then held that aggravated felonies, within the
circuits.
meaning of sections 1101(a)(43)(F) and (G), include convictions for crimes
of violence and theft in which the full sentence imposed was at least one
year, regardless of the time actually served in prison.244
The court also addressed the sixteen-level enhancement in United
States v. Guzman-Bera.24' Defendant was convicted of grand theft and
sentenced to five years of probation at the time of his deportation. After
he re-entered the United States, his probation was revoked, and he was
sentenced to eighteen months in prison.24' The Eleventh Circuit
vacated the sixteen-level enhancement, holding that "when a defendant
has simply been placed on probation and has not been sentenced to a
and reentry, the 'aggravated
prison term at the time of deportation
2 47
felony' enhancement does not apply."
The court in Guzman-Bera again looked at the missing language in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and noted that it was arguable the statute
referred to the "authorizedterm of imprisonment, even if not imposed,

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2000).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F)-(G) (Supp. V 1999).
Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) n.2.
216 F.3d 940 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 942-44.
Id.

244. Id. at 944.
245. 216 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir. 2000)
246. Id. at 1020.
247. Id.
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However, the
or the term of imprisonment actually imposed."2
by the
felony
is
defined
"an
aggravated
Eleventh Circuit held that
2
49
The court then determined that the
sentence actually imposed."
sentence "actually imposed" was probation.2" The court emphasized
that defendant was not sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment
until after he had been deported and had illegally reentered the United
States.251 Thus, the sixteen-level enhancement was inapplicable.2 52
Part S: Money Laundering
In United States v. Thayer,253 defendant was convicted of conspiracy
to engage in mail and wire fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, money
laundering conspiracy, and money laundering.254 The Eleventh Circuit
held that the district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. section 2S1.1,
noting that the money laundering guideline was intended to "criminalize
a broad array of money laundering activity, not just drug related
offenses."255
H.

V.

CHAPTER THREE: ADJUSTMENTS

U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.1: Role in the Offense
The guidelines provide for upward or downward adjustments
depending on the defendant's aggravating or mitigating role in the
offense.256 In 2000 the Eleventh Circuit did not publish any decisions
discussing mitigating role adjustments. However, it did address the
aggravating role adjustments in published decisions.257

A.

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1021.
251. Id. "Although his 1995 conviction may have become an aggravated felony after
his reentry into the United States and he received the 18-month prison sentence, it was
not one when he was deported and when he reentered the United States, and should have
not have been used for enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)." Id.
252. Id.
253. 204 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2000).
254. Id. at 1354.
255. Id. at 1356 (citing United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1102 (11th Cir. 1996)).
256. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (2000) (aggravating role); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (2000) (mitigating

role).
257. In addition to the two cases discussed in the text of this section of the Article, the
court also addressed aggravating role adjustments in two cases that are discussed
elsewhere in this Article because they are more relevant to the interpretation of other
guidelines. For example, in Yeager, the defendant did not dispute the finding that he was
an organizer or leader in the overall RICO conspiracy. Instead, the case focused on the
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In Smith, a voter fraud case, the district court applied a four-level role
enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.1(a), finding that each
defendant was an "organizer or leader of criminal activity that involved
five or more participants or was otherwise extensive."258 Defendants
argued that the evidence did not establish "their criminal activity, as
distinguished from their First Amendment-protected political activity,
was extensive," and the district court did not identify the five participants involved in the criminal activity.259 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected this argument because the district court adopted the presentence report's factual findings, and the presentence report identified the
five participants and defendants' activities. 26°
In United States v. Jimenez,2"' the district court applied a two-level
enhancement under section 3B.A(c) to defendant's sentence because
defendant was a supervisor of a conspiracy.262 The Eleventh Circuit
stated that although "being a drug supplier does not automatically make
[a defendant] a 'supervisor' under the Guidelines, . . . the assertion of

control or influence over only one individual is enough to support a
§ 3B1. 1(c) enhancement."26 3 The court found that the fact that defendant's girlfriend consulted with him when discussing drug transactions
and before agreeing to sell drugs sufficient to establish that defendant
asserted control or influence over her."' Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the role enhancement was not clearly erroneous.265

proper method of applying the role enhancement in cases involving RICO offenses. 210

F.3d at 1316-17. Thus, Yeager is discussed in connection with the RICO guideline, U.S.S.G.
§ 2El.l, supra Part V.C.
In United States v.Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 759 (lth Cir. 2000), cert denied, 60 U.S.L.W.
3575 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2001) (No. 00-8134), defendant challenged the role enhancement

because it was based on hearsay statements, and the district court failed to make specific
factual findings to support the enhancement. In resolving these challenges, the Eleventh
Circuit focused on U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3. Id. at 759-61. Therefore, Gordon is discussed in
connection with that guideline. See infra Part VIII.A.
258. 231 F.3d at 820 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) (2000)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 820-21.
261. 224 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2000).
262. Section 3B1.1(c) provides: [ilf the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager,
or supervisor in any criminal activity, other than described in (a) or (b), increase [the
defendant's offense level] by 2 levels." 8 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) (2000).
263. 224 F.3d at 1251 (citing United States v. Yates, 990 F.2d 1179, 1182 (l1th Cir.
1993); United States v. Glover, 179 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 1999)).
264. Id.
265. Id.
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B.

U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.2: Abuse of Position of Trust
In Ward the Eleventh Circuit reversed a two-level enhancement for
abuse of a position of trust, under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.3. ss Defendant used his position as a security guard to steal funds that were being
transported in the armored car he was guarding.2 67 The commentary
to section 3B1.3 states that "a position of public or private trust [is]
characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial
discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference).
Persons holding such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less
supervision than employees whose responsibilities are primarily nondiscretionary in nature."2' The Eleventh Circuit noted that as a
security guard, defendant "had very little discretion in performing his
duty" and was "closely, albeit not constantly, supervised by his
employer."269 The court further noted that a security guard position
is similar to an ordinary bank teller, hotel clerk, or mail carrier.27
The commentary states that the enhancement does not apply to bank
tellers or hotel clerks.271 However, the commentary specifically notes
that a postal service employee, who steals or destroys undelivered mail,
is subject to the enhancement.2 72 The court stated that in specifically
applying the enhancement to mail carriers, notwithstanding the other
commentary provisions, "the commission thought that otherwise mail
delivery positions would not be covered."273 No such provision was
made for security guard positions. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit determined that such positions were excluded from the enhancement. 4

266. 222 F.3d at 913. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (2000) provides for a two-level upward
adjustment if "the defendant abused a position of public or private trust... in a manner
that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense."
267. 222 F.3d at 909.

268. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.
269. 222 F.3d at 912-13.
270. Id. at 913.
271. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 states:
The adjustment, for example, applies in the case of an embezzlement of a client's
funds by an attorney serving as a guardian, a bank executive's fraudulent loan
scheme, or the criminal sexual abuse of a patient by a physician under the guise
of an examination. The adjustment does not apply in the case of an embezzlement
or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk because such positions are not
characterized by the above-described factors.
Id.
272. 222 F.3d at 913.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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In United States v.Linville,275 defendant was convicted on one count
of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and four counts of bank fraud. On
appeal he challenged the two-level enhancement for abuse of a position
of trust, arguing that the bank was the victim of the bank fraud, and
that the bank had not conferred a position of trust on him. Rather, his
employer had conferred the position of trust on him by giving him
signature authority, which he used to forge checks in committing the
instant offenses.27 The Eleventh Circuit noted that "[ain abuse-oftrust enhancement is appropriate whenever the 'defendant [was] in a
position of trust with respect to the victim of the crime' and abuses that
2 77
position 'ina manner that significantly facilitate[s]' the offense."
Holding that "bank fraud may have more than one victim for U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.3 purposes, and that victim status turns on the facts of the case,"
the court affirmed the enhancement based on the district court's finding
that the employer was a victim of this offense.2 78
In Smith defendant was convicted of conspiring "to vote more than
once in a general election by applying for and casting fraudulent
absentee ballots in the names of voters without the voters' knowledge
and consent" and with "conspiring to knowingly and willfully give false
information as to a voter's name and address for the purpose of
establishing the voter's eligibility to vote" in a general election.2 79 The
district court applied the abuse of trust enhancement to one defendant,
who was a deputy registrar. The deputy registrar argued that her
position could not have significantly facilitated the commission of the
offense because her codefendant, who was not a deputy registrar, was
convicted of the same offenses.2 °
The commentary to section 3B1.3 provides that "the position of public
or private trust must have contributed in some significant way to
facilitating the commission or concealment of the offense." 28 ' The court
explained that "[slignificant facilitation" occurs when "the person in the
position of trust has an advantage in committing the crime because of

275. 228 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2000).
276. Id. at 1331.
277. Id. (citing United States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831,837 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.3).
278. Id. Although the government had conceded error in this case, the court noted that
it was "not required to accept such a concession when the law and record do not justify it."
Id. at 1331 n.2.
279. 231 F.3d at 804-05.
280. Id. at 819.
281. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2000).
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that trust and uses that advantage in order to commit the crime." 282

In rejecting defendant's argument, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
position of trust need not be "essential to a defendant's commission of
the offense. " " Ergo, the enhancement can apply to one defendant, but
not to other defendants who commit the same offense without the use or
abuse of the defendant's position.28 4 The court then affirmed the
enhancement because defendant's position as deputy registrar "significantly
aided her commission of an offense for which she was convict285
ed."

C. U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1: Obstruction of Justice
U.S.S.G. section 3C1.1 provides for a two-level enhancement if "the
defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction."88
The commentary lists several examples of conduct to which the
enhancement applies.8 7 One example is when the defendant destroys
or conceals material evidence or directs another person to do so.288
However, the commentary adds that "if such conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest," it will only warrant the enhancement if "it
resulted in a material hindrance
to the official investigation or prosecu289
tion of the instant offense."

In United States v. Garcia,2' defendant's offense level was enhanced
under section 3C1.1 because he buried guns, instructed his secretary to
remove and destroy evidence, and fled the country. Defendant challenged the enhancement, arguing that no federal investigation had been

282. 231 F.3d at 819 (quoting United States v. Barakat, 130 F.3d 1448, 1455 (l1th Cir.
1997)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 820. The court explained that the deputy registrar "was convicted of
offenses involving [another person's] vote, offenses which were dependant upon [the other
person] having been registered to vote, and [the defendant] used her position as deputy
registrar to bring that about (fraudulently)." Id. The court also rejected as "specious"
defendant's argument that her position as deputy registrar was not a position of public
trust. Id.
286. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2000).
287. Id. cmt. n.4.
288. Id. cmt. n.4(d).
289. Id.
290. 208 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated by Garcia v. United States, 121 S.
Ct. 750 (2001) (the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit was vacated for reconsideration in
light of Apprendi).
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initiated at the time he committed said acts.291 Additionally, he
argued that his conduct "was not a hindrance because the investigation
had abundant evidence from other sources."292 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected these arguments, noting that "[tihere is no requirement that
defendant's obstructive acts occur subsequent to the formal commencement of an investigation."29 The Eleventh Circuit explained that the
"sentencing guidelines are not intended to create a formal date for the
measurement of obstructive acts but rather, to distinguish those acts
that are instinctively done in the heat of being caught engaged in the
crime from those done before or after with cool calculation."2" The
court further found that "[tihe 'actual hindrance' test is only for those
acts done at the time of arrest .... In short, the key to a finding of

obstruction is the intention of the actor, not the actual success of his
obstructive acts."295
In Smith defendant challenged the obstruction enhancement on appeal
29 6
because the district court failed to make specific findings of fact.
The district court found that "[t]he evidence at trial presented or
established, beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant Smith
influenced Michael HunLter to give a false affidavit concerning material
facts."297 The Eleventh Circuit stated, "[w]hile it might have been
preferable for the district court to identify the material facts about which
Hunter testified falsely and for which Smith was responsible,. .. 'in the
context of the record.

.

., detailed findings were not necessary and would

have been redundant."'298 The Eleventh Circuit then affirmed the
sentence, noting that the district court indicated its finding was based
on the evidence presented at trial, and it expressly adopted the factual
statements in the presentence report, which discussed in detail
defendant's actions that warranted the enhancement. 2" The Eleventh
Circuit also noted that because defendant "did not request more specific
findings of fact by the district court '[i]t is too late to now complain in
this court.'"3"'

291. Id. at 1262.
292. Id.
293. Id. Additionally, the court found that the record showed defendant was under
investigation before the acts occurred. Id.
294. Id.

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
quotes

Id. (citing United States v. Rowlett, 23 F.3d 300, 305-06 (10th Cir. 1994)).
231 F.3d at 820.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Hubert, 138 F.3d 912, 915 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Gregg, 179 F.3d 1312, 1317 (l1th Cir. 1999) (internal
omitted)).
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U.S.S.G. Section 3D1.2: Multiple Counts (Grouping)

The only published opinion in 2000 to discuss the application of
U.S.S.G. section 3D1.2 is McIntosh.3 ° ' In McIntosh the Eleventh
Circuit discussed the grouping rules in the context of interstate
transportation of child pornography by computer. 2
McIntosh is
discussed under the section of this Article that addresses the child
pornography guideline, U.S.S.G. section 2G2.2.30 3
E.

U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1: Acceptance of Responsibility

In Garciadefendant challenged the district court's refusal to adjust his
guidelines downward for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.
section 3El.1.304 The Eleventh Circuit held that although defendant
had pled guilty, he had actively avoided responsibility "from the start to
near the finish."0 5
Defendant had destroyed evidence, hid from
authorities, lived under an assumed name in another country, denied
overwhelming identification evidence after he was arrested, and
frivolously attempted to avoid extradition.3"'
Thus,30°the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the denial of acceptance of responsibility.
In Thayer the district court also declined to apply the acceptance of
responsibility adjustment. Defendant argued that the fact he went to
trial was not a per se preclusion from receiving an acceptance of
responsibility reduction.3 8 The Eleventh Circuit agreed that "there is
no bright line rule; instead, trial courts have discretion."3 9 In exercising that discretion, the district court may consider the fact that a
defendant went to trial.a 0 In upholding the district court's decision to
deny the reduction, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court
judge "presided over the trial, was familiar with the position of the
appellant during trial
and could evaluate the sincerity of the 'acceptance
31
of responsibility.' 1

301.
302.
303.

216 F.3d at 1251.
Id. at 1253-54.
See supra Part IV.D.

304.

208 F.3d at 1262.

305.

Id.

306. Id. at 1262-63.
307. Id. at 1263.
308. 204 F.3d at 1358 (citing United States v. Castillo-Valencia, 917 F.2d 494, 498
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rodriquez, 905 F.2d 372, 373 (11th Cir. 1990)).

309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CRIMINAL HISTORY AND CRIMINAL LIVELIHOOD
PartA: CriminalHistory

In United States v. Buter,312 defendant received three criminal
history points under U.S.S.G. section 4A1.1(a) for each of the two
sentences imposed on two state probation revocations. The state court
had imposed concurrent terms of twenty-seven months imprisonment.
However, defendant did not serve any time on these sentences. Rather,
his imprisonment was ordered to run concurrent with a federal sentence
that he had already completed. 313 The Eleventh Circuit held that
these state court sentences did not constitute imprisonment for purposes
of computing a defendant's criminal history category under section
4AL.1.314 The court explained that under section 4A1.1, three criminal
history points are added "for each prior sentence of imprisonment
exceeding one year and one month." 315 U.S.S.G. section 4A1.2(b)
defines "sentence of imprisonment" as "a sentence of incarceration."3 1"
The commentary states, in part, "To qualify as a sentence of imprisonment, the defendant must have actually served a period of imprisonment
on such sentence."317 The court adopted a two-part test to determine
whether a sentence qualifies for the three additional criminal history
points. 18
First, the sentence must "exceed one year and one
month." 9 2 Second, "some time [must] actually be served on that
3
sentence." 1
Applying this test, the court stated that defendant's twenty-seven
month state sentences satisfied the first prong of the test, but not the
"
second prong-he did not actually serve time on those sentences.32
' By
giving defendant credit for the time he served on a prior unrelated
federal case, the state court allowed him to walk "out of the state

312.
313.
314.

229 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1078-79.

315. Id. at 1078. Three points are added for a "prior sentence of imprisonment
exceeding one year and one month." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) (2000). Two points are added for
a "prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days." Id. § 4Al.l(b). One point is

added for a prior sentence not counted under section 4A1.1(a) or (b). Id. § 4A1.1(c).
316. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(b) (2000).
317. Id. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2.
318. 229 F.3d at 1078-79.
319. Id. at 1078 (quoting United States v. Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1995)).

320. Id.
321. Id. at 1078-79.
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courtroom a free man."322 To assess criminal history points for such

a sentence "would be penalizing [defendant] for something which the
state 32authorities
determined was not deserving of further incarcera3
tion."
The Eleventh Circuit further supported its decision by reference to the
way the guidelines treat suspended sentences, which only count as one
criminal history point.324 The court observed,
It is patently unreasonable to punish a defendant by adding three
points in the sentencing equation for a sentence which had no
detrimental repercussions whatsoever, either in the past or in the
future, but count only one point for a suspended sentence
which, if
3 25
revoked, could result in the defendant's imprisonment.
In Cooper defendant challenged a criminal history point assessed for

his misdemeanor convictions for driving with a suspended license and
possessing marijuana. He argued that he was unrepresented by counsel
when he pled guilty and was sentenced to one day in jail. 326 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that "[glenerally, this court does not allow a
defendant to attack collaterally the constitutionality of a conviction for
the first time in a sentencing proceeding."327 Although defendant's
misdemeanor convictions were uncounseled, the court noted that
defendant had the burden "to lay a factual foundation for collateral
review on the ground that the state conviction was 'presumptively
void.'" 328 The Eleventh Circuit then found that the district court did
not err when it assessed the additional criminal history point under
U.S.S.G. section 4A1.1(c) because defendant had not met his threshold
329
burden.
In Castillo v. United States," ° the defendant appealed the denial of
his motion for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
He requested that his criminal history be recalculated because two
points were added as a result of a state court conviction that was
reversed and then dismissed after his federal sentence was imposed.

322. Id. at 1079.
323. Id. (citing United States v. Stewart, 49 F.3d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1995)).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. 203 F.3d at 1287.
327. Id. The court referred to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.6, which states "this guideline
and commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior
conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in the law." Id.
328. Id. (quoting United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117, 1120 (11th Cir. 1993)).
329. Id.
330. 200 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Defendant relied on the commentary to U.S.S.G. section 4A1.2, which
provides that if a conviction has been reversed, vacated, or ruled
unconstitutional, the sentence is not calculated in computing the
defendant's criminal history points.33 ' However, the Eleventh Circuit
pointed out that the commentary also provides that if a conviction is set
aside "for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law," the sentence
should be counted. 32 The Eleventh Circuit then noted that defendant's conviction in this case was set aside in a ruling that was adverse
to defendant.333 The fact that the state later dismissed the charges
was deemed irrelevant by the court.1 4 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that the district court could properly consider the conduct
underlying the charges to which defendant had originally pled nolo
contendere in determining defendant's criminal history score.335
B.

PartB: CriminalLivelihood
Chapter Four, Part B, of the guidelines provides for three types of
criminal livelihood enhancements-career offender,336 criminal livelihood,337 and armed career criminal.338 In 2000 the only opinions by
the Eleventh Circuit addressing criminal livelihood enhancements were
in the context of the career offender. Although the court dealt with
armed career criminal sentences in three cases, 339 the court discussed
the statutory enhancement, 340 not the armed career criminal guideline.3 4 ' Therefore, those cases are not discussed in this Article.
However, the two career offender cases are discussed below.
In United States v. Jackson,342 defendant challenged his career
offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 4B 1.1, arguing that one of
the prior convictions the district court relied on was not a "crime of
violence" under the definition provided by U.S.S.G. section 4B1.2(a).

331. Id. at 736-37 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.6 (2000)).
332. Id. at 737 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.10 (2000)).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 738.
335. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (2000)).
336. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2000).
337. Id. § 4B1.3.
338. Id. § 4B1.4.
339. See United States v. Lee, 208 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Richardson, 230 F.3d 1297 (11th
Cir. 2000).
340. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994).
341. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4.
342. 199 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Defendant's prior conviction was for the state crime of possession of a

fire bomb.3 43 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the challenge, stating
[A] person who intends to damage a structure or property by fire or
explosion clearly participates in conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to others. Even assuming that the
structure or property which is the target of a fire344bomb is unoccupied,
the fire or explosion creates a danger to others.
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that section 4B1.2(a) specifically lists
arson as a crime of violence.3 45 According to the Eleventh Circuit,
possession of a fire bomb is "nothing more than a subcategory of arson
that presents at least the same potential risk of physical injury to
another person as arson.
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
"the possession of a fire bomb with the intent to use it to willfully
damage any structure or property by fire or explosion," as defined by the
state statute, qualifies as a prior crime of violence for purposes of the
career offender enhancement.34 7
In Rogers the Eleventh Circuit held that in drug cases brought under
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), drug quantity is an element of the
offense that "must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Apprendi."348 The court in
Rogers then vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the
district court for resentencing under section 841(b)(1)(C), which applies
whenever the indictment does not specify a quantity of drugs and the
jury verdict convicts the defendant of a drug offense involving an
undetermined quantity of crack cocaine. 49 In so doing, the court noted
that the statutory maximum under section 841(b)(1)(C) is twenty years
imprisonment.35 °
This statutory maximum impacted the career
offender enhancement.
U.S.S.G. section 4B1.1 provides for varying base offense levels
depending on the "Offense Statutory Maximum." The commentary
defines "Offense Statutory Maximum" as "the maximum term of

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 1280.
Id.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
Id.
228 F.3d at 1327.
Id. at 1328.

350. Id. Although section 841(b)(1)(C) allows for a thirty-year sentence of imprisonment if the defendant has a prior drug conviction, the court held that the enhancement did
not apply because defendant's sentence was not imposed in accordance with the
requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 851. Id.
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imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction."3 5' The higher
the statutory maximum, the higher the base offense level.352
Defendant in Rogers was sentenced under the career offender
provision relating to section 841(b)(1)(A).353 Because section 841(b)(1)(A) has a maximum term of life imprisonment, section 4B1. 1(A) provides
for base offense level thirty-seven. However, the Eleventh Circuit held
that defendant was convicted under section 841(b)(1)(C), which has a
statutory maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment. 5 4 Section
4B 1.1(C) calls for base offense level thirty-two if the statutory maximum
is twenty years imprisonment. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
sentence and remanded for resentencing under the correct guideline,
section 4B 1.1(C), which relates to a statutory maximum of twenty years
imprisonment.3
VII.

CHAPTER FIVE: DETERMINING THE SENTENCE

A.

Part C: Imprisonment (Safety Valve)
A defendant charged with a drug offense under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844,
960, or 963 may receive a sentence below the statutory mandatory
minimum penalty if he or she successfully complies with the five criteria
outlined in U.S.S.G. section 5C1.2(1)-(5).356 Additionally, if a defen-

351. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 cmt. n.2 (2000).
352. The following chart sets forth the interplay between the statutory maximum
penalties in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) (1994 & Supp. 1999) and the corresponding base
offense levels in U.S.S.G. sections 4B1.1(A)-(C).
Statute

Statutory

Guideline

Offense Statutory

Base Offense

Maximum

Level

Maximum
§ 841(b)(1)(A)

life

§ 4BI.1(A)

life

37

§ 841(b)(1)(B)

40 years

§ 4B1.1(B)

25 years or more

34

§ 841(b)(1)(C)

20 years

§ 4B1.1(C)

20 years or more,
but less than 25

32

years

353. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(A).
354. 228 F.3d at 1330.
355. Id.

356. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(1)-(5) (2000). The five criteria, as set forth in section 5C1.2, are:
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined
under the sentencing guidelines;
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dant meets the criteria, he may recieve a two-level reduction if the
offense level is twenty-six or greater." 7
In United States v. Anderson, 5 ' the Eleventh Circuit dealt with the
issue of whether a defendant can receive a safety valve reduction if he
is convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000
feet of an elementary school, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 860."' The
applicable guideline for a section 860 offense is U.S.S.G. section 2D1.2.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that section 2D1.2 has no provision
comparable to the safety valve provision of section 2D1.1(b)(6). s° The
court then turned to the safety valve provision contained in U.S.S.G.
section 5C1.2.3 ' The court stated that although section 860 "necessarily includes a violation of either section 841(a) or section 856," section
860 is "a substantive criminal statute, not a mere sentence enhancer for
section 841(a)."5 2 Thus, the court held that because section 860 was
not one of the specifically enumerated statutes to which the safety valve
applied, a defendant convicted under section 860 is not eligible for the
safety valve reduction pursuant to section 5C1.2."'3

(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a
firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others
in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not
engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully
provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has
concerning the offense that were part of the same course of conduct or of a
common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful
other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the
information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant
has complied with this requirement.
Id.
357. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(6) (2000).
358. 200 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2000).
359. Id. at 1346.
360. Id. at 1347.
361. Id.
362. Id. (quoting United States v. Saavedra, 148 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1998)).
363. Id. at 1347-48. The statutes specifically enumerated in U.S.S.G. section 5C1.2 are
21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 960, and 963. It should be noted that a defendant convicted under
section 860 is also subject to a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 2D1.2(a)(a)
for selling drugs in a protected location, e.g., within a 1,000 feet of an elementary school.
Thus, such a defendant not only receives a two-level enhancement, but also is ineligible for
the two-level reduction under the safety valve guideline. Also such a defendant is ineligible
to receive a sentence below the minimum mandatory, unless the government files a
substantial assistance motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 5K1.1 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 35.

1462

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

In United States v. Brownlee, 4 the parties agreed that defendant
had completely satisfied the first four criteria of the safety valve
guideline. However, the Government argued that defendant had not
satisfied the fifth criteria because, although defendant truthfully
disclosed information relating to his drug offense immediately prior to
the sentencing hearing, he had lied on numerous prior occasions. 65
The Eleventh Circuit'rejected the Government's argument and held that
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. section 5C1.2 provide only one deadline
for truthful disclosure.3" The deadline is "not later than the time of
the sentencing hearing."3N 7 Thus, defendant was entitled to safety
valve relief because he made a truthful disclosure prior to the sentencing
hearing."'

As in Brownlee, only the truthful disclosure requirement of the safety
3 69
At sentencing the
valve was at issue in United States v. Figueroa.
district court found that parts of defendant's statements were not
credible. ° Nonetheless, because the court found that defendant did
not have more information regarding the leader of the drug operation
charged in the case, the court applied the safety valve. 371 The district
court based its decision on section 5C1.2(5), which indicates "the fact
that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide
or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not
preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied
with this requirement. "372 The Government appealed, arguing that
defendant's incomplete and untruthful disclosure during the sentencing
hearing precluded the safety valve reduction. 73 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed noting that a defendant who has no relevant or useful
information can still get safety valve relief, but a defendant who is
untruthful cannot.3 74

364. 204 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
365. Id. at 1304.
366. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (2000)).
367. Id. (quoting United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1999)).
368. Id. at 1305.
369. 199 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2000).
370. Id. at 1283. Specifically, the court noted that it was "not prepared to accept
everything in [the defendant's] statement." Id. at 1283.

371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1282-83.
374. Id. at 1283.
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Part D: Supervised Release
In United States v. Bull," 5 defendant was convicted of using an
unauthorized credit card. As a special condition of supervised release,
the district court imposed mental health treatment for anger control
because defendant had a history of anger-related problems. 76 Defendant challenged this condition on appeal, arguing that it was not
reasonably related to the "nature and characteristics of his offense," as
required by U.S.S.G. section 5D1.3(b) 7 Defendant's argument raised
an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit: whether the district
court had authority to impose a condition of supervised release that was
unrelated to the crime of which defendant was convicted.378 In
resolving the issue, the court reasoned that "the items listed in 5D1.3(b)
are not necessary elements, each of which has to be present. They are
merely factors to be weighed, and the conditions imposed may be
unrelated to one or more of the factors, so long as they are sufficiently
related to the others."37 9 Hence, the court held that "[als a matter of
B.

375.

214 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000).

376. Id. at 1276.
377. Id. Section 5D1.3(b) provides:
The court may impose other conditions of supervised release, to the extent that
such conditions (1) are reasonably related to (A) the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (B) the need for
the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) the
need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) the need
to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; and (2) involve
no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set
forth above and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b) (2000). Section 5D1.3(d)(5), which pertains to mental health programs,
states:
(d) (Policy statement) The following "special" conditions of supervised release are
recommended in the circumstances described and, in addition, may otherwise be
appropriate in particular cases:
(5) Mental Health Program Participation
If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is in need of psychological or
psychiatric treatment-a condition requiring that the defendant participate in a
mental health program approved by the United States Probation Office.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(5) (2000).
378. 214 F.3d at 1276.
379. Id. at 1277 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 998 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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law, the special condition imposed need not be related to each factor
listed in section 5D1.3(b)."3 80
Turning to the facts of the case at hand, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that defendant had a history of anger control problems.
The special condition imposed by the court requiring [defendant] to
participate in mental health treatment for anger and violence, if
deemed appropriate by the probation officer, clearly relates to his
history and characteristics. The condition is not so broad as to deprive
[defendant] of any of his constitutionally protected liberties. 8 '
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this
condition.382
In United States v. Chavez,383 the court stated that a mandatory
term of supervised release is only required when the defendant is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 3 " Defendant in Chavez was
sentenced to a term of probation with a special condition that he reside
in a community corrections facility.3 5 The Eleventh Circuit stated
that the confinement in the half-way house did not constitute imprisonment. 8' Therefore, defendant was not subject to a mandatory term of
supervised release. 8s
C.

Part K: Departures

In 2000 the Eleventh Circuit followed the trend that it has set over
the past few years. It affirmed upward departures, reversed downward
departures, and affirmed district court decisions not to depart downward. However, unlike recent years, in 2000 the court only engaged in
a detailed discussion of the substance of the departure at issue in one
case.
In Nealy388 the court held that the Government did not violate
defendant's due process rights by refusing to file a motion to depart
The Government
downward based on substantial assistance.3' 9
but refused to
substantial
assistance,
that
defendant
provided
conceded
file a motion for downward departure under U.S.S.G. section 5K1.1

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id.
204 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1312.
204 F.3d at 1309.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1312.
232 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 831.
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because after defendant provided the substantial assistance, he was
again arrested for possession with intent to distribute drugs. 390 The
court relied on section 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for the proposition
that "the government has 'a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a
defendant has substantially assisted.'" '91 The Eleventh Circuit held
that its review of the Government's refusal to file a motion for downward
departure based on substantial assistance was limited to claims of
unconstitutional motive, which were not made in this case. 92
In the rest of the departure cases, the Eleventh Circuit did not discuss
the substance of the departures in detail. For example, in Harper
defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography, and the
district court departed upward one criminal history category, finding
defendant's criminal history was underrepresented.393 The Eleventh
394
Circuit affirmed the upward departure "without further discussion."
In United States v. Gordon,395 defendant argued that the district
court improperly relied on unreliable hearsay statements by his

390. Id.
391. Id. (quoting Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 184 (1992)).
392. Id. In so holding, the court rejected the approach of the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Anvalone, 148 F.3d 940, 941 (8th Cir. 1998).
393. 218 F.3d at 1286 & n.1. Although the opinion does not state the basis of the
departure, the reference to the criminal history being underrepresented indicates the
departure was based on U.S.S.G. section 4A1.3. Nonetheless, Harper is discussed under
Chapter 5, Part K, because it is indicative of how the Eleventh Circuit treated departures
in 2000.
The Eleventh Circuit opinion also did not detail the facts underlying the upward
departure. However, its recitation of the facts underlying the offense is insightful. The
court noted that in 1989, defendant had been convicted of molesting his wife's minor niece
repeatedly between 1983 and 1989 in two different counties. Id. at 1286. After he was
paroled, his probation officer inspected his home and found the computer disk containing
between 600 and 1,000 pornographic pictures of minors that formed the basis of the instant
federal conviction for possession of child pornography. Id. Presumably, this is the criminal
history that the court found was underrepresented.
394. Id. at 1286 n.1. The court cited 11th Cir. R. 36-1, which provides:
When the court determines that any of the following circumstances exists:
(a) the judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact that are not
clearly erroneous;
(b) the evidence in support of a jury verdict is sufficient;
(c) the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole;
(d) a summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the pleadings is
supported by the record;
(e) the judgment has been entered without a reversible error of law;
and an opinion would have no precedential value, the judgment or order may be
affirmed or enforced without opinion.
395. 231 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 2000).
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codefendant to support an upward departure under U.S.S.G. sections
5K2.3 and 5K2.8, based on the victim's psychological injury and the
severity of defendant's conduct."' The court found that the hearsay
statements relied on by the district court to support this upward
departure had sufficient indicia of reliability in that the codefendants'
statements were consistent with each other and were corroborated.397
The court also noted that although defendant had an opportunity to
discredit
these witnesses by calling them at sentencing, he failed to do
3
SO. 9A

A defendant in Thayer challenged the denial of a downward departure
for diminished capacity, claiming that the district court misunderstood
The Eleventh Circuit did not
the diminished capacity guideline."
elucidate the district court's findings, but stated that it had reviewed
them and concluded that the district court understood the guidelines,
but found defendant did not suffer from diminished capacity.4 °°
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision not
to depart downward." '
In Bravo defendant filed a motion for a sentence adjustment based on
a retroactive guideline amendment.40 2 He also asked the court to
depart downward from the new sentence based on his medical condition.4"3 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's conclusion
that "it lacked jurisdiction to depart downward because of [defendant's]
[18
medical condition to an extent greater than that authorized 4under
04
U.S.C. §1 3582(c) based on the amended guideline provision."
In Simpson defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine base, two counts of distributing cocaine base,

396. Id. at 759. Section 5K2.3 provides, "[i]f a victim or victims suffered psychological
injury much more serious than that normally resulting from commission of the offense, the
court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3

(2000).
Section 5K2.8 provides, "i]f the defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal,
or degrading to the victim, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range
to reflect the nature of the conduct." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8 (2000).

397. 231 F.3d at 760.
398. Id. The court's holding, which also applied to the role enhancement, is discussed
in more detail in connection with U.S.S.G. section 6A1.3, the subsection concerning the
resolution of disputed factors. See infra Part VIII.A.
399. 204 F.3d at 1356.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. 203 F.3d at 780. This case is discussed in detail under the section of this article
relating to U.S.S.G. section 1BI.10. See supra Part III.B.
403. 203 F.3d at 780.
404. Id. at 781.
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and two counts of carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.
The presentence report concluded that defendant's guideline range on
the drug counts was 292 to 365 months imprisonment. He was also
subject to consecutive sentences of five years and twenty years on the
two firearm counts, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Therefore, his minimum
sentence was calculated at 592 months imprisonment.4 °5 The district
court agreed with the calculations in the presentence report, but
concluded that a 592-month sentence was "disproportionate to the
gravity of the defendant's offenses" and reduced his sentence to a total
of 352 months imprisonment.4 °6
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not have
authority to depart downward from the mandatory sentencing provisions
7
set forth in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 851, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 41 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that "the relevant statutorily authorized
mandatory minimum sentences exceeded the relevant Sentencing
Guidelines range, and, therefore, took precedence over them. Moreover,
the district court had no discretion to depart downward from the
Although
relevant statutory mandatory minimum sentences."4"'
mandatory
twenty-year
defendant's guidelines were less than the
minimum penalty under the drug statute, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that "where a guideline range falls entirely below a mandatory minimum
0
sentence, the court must follow the statutory minimum."4 ' Therefore,
the district court was required to sentence the defendant to twenty years
Additionally, the Eleventh
imprisonment on the drug charges. 4'0

at 1297-98.
405. 228 4'.:f
406. Id. at 1298. As discussed under the section of this Article relating to U.S.S.G.
section 2D1.1, supra Part IV.B.2, defendant successfully appealed the district court's
calculation of the quantity of drugs attributable to him. Id. at 1302. However, the
government was also successful in its cross-appeal of the downward departure. Id.
407. Id. at 1302-1304. Section 841(b) provides for a sentence of not less than twenty
years imprisonment if the defendant's offense involved fifty grams or more of a mixture or
substance containing cocaine base and the defendant committed the offense after a prior
conviction for a felony drug offense. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994 & Supp. 1999). The
Government had filed the required enhancement notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851, thereby
triggering the twenty-year mandatory minimum prison term. 228 F.3d at 1303. Under
section 924(c)(1), a first conviction carries a mandatory term of five years imprisonment
and a second conviction carries a term of twenty years imprisonment. Section 924(c)(1)
requires that such sentences be imposed consecutively. Id. at 1304.
It should be noted that on November 13, 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was amended to
increase the penalty for a second or subsequent conviction to twenty-five years imprisonment.
408. 228 F.3d at 1302-03.
409. Id. at 1303. See also U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1.
410. 228 F.3d at 1304.
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Circuit determined that defendant was required to serve a mandatory
term of twenty-five years imprisonment on the firearms counts
consecutive to the twenty-year sentence on the drug counts. 41 1 Because the district court had no discretion to depart downward 412
in this
case, the sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing.
VIII.

CHAPTER SIX: SENTENCING PROCEDURES AND PLEA
AGREEMENTS

A.

Part A: Sentencing Procedures
U.S.S.G. section 6A1.3 allows the district court to rely on "relevant
information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of
evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy."411 In Gordon
defendant argued that the district court improperly relied on unreliable
hearsay statements by his codefendant to support a role enhancement
and an upward departure. Defendant also challenged the failure of the
district court to make specific findings about the reliability of the
hearsay statements.4 4 The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendant's
claims, noting that the district court had informed him the codefendants
were prepared to testify at the sentencing hearing, but he failed to call
them.415 The court further found that the hearsay statements had
sufficient indicia of reliability because the codefendants' statements were
consistent with each other regarding defendant's role in the offense.41
Concerning the challenge to the district court's failure to make specific
findings on the reliability of the statements, the Eleventh Circuit
distinguished its decision in United States v. Lee,4" 7 noting that
"'[s]pecific findings on (the co-conspirator's] credibility are necessary
before the district court can use this evidence as a basis for determining
the base offense level in order to sentence' the defendant."418 In
contrast to the insufficient indicia of reliability in Lee, the evidence in
Gordon was "materially consistent" concerning defendant's role and
offense conduct. 419 "While it may be advisable and in some instances

411.
412.
413.
414.

Id. at 1304-05.
Id. at 1305.
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (2000).
231 F.3d at 759.

415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id. at 759-60.
Id. at 760.
68 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 1995).
231 F.3d at 760.
Id. at 760-61.
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necessary for a district court to make distinct findings regarding the
reliability of hearsay statements used at sentencing, the absence of such
where the
findings does not necessarily require reversal or remand
4 20
reliability of the statements is apparent from the record."
B.

Part B: Plea Agreements

In Thayer the Eleventh Circuit rejected defendant's claim that the
government breached the plea agreement when it failed to request a
lower offense level due in part to "super acceptance" of responsibility.4 2 ' The court noted that "prior to sentencing, the government
learned that [defendant] had underhandedly transferred assets to her
daughter."422 Applying the plain error standard of review because
defendant did not object at sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
defendant "never argues that the sentence imposed is unfair, rather she
42
argues that she would be released sooner but for the sentence." 1
Thus, the court found that, under the plain error standard, "the breach
of the plea agreement does not rise to the level of unjustly affecting a
substantial right of the defendant." 4 4 Additionally, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the district court "possessed discretion to make
independent findings and sentence accordingly."425 Thus, the sentence
was affirmed.4 26
In United States v. Tyndale,42" defendant challenged the validity of
his guilty plea on the basis of U.S.S.G. section 6B1.1(c) because his
presentence report had not been completed at the time he entered the
plea.428 Under section 6B1.1(c), the court is required to "defer its
decision to accept or reject any nonbinding recommendation pursuant to
Rule 11(e)(1)(B), and the court's decision to accept or reject any plea
agreement pursuant to Rules 11(e)(1)(A) and 11(e)(1)(C) until there has
been an opportunity to consider the presentence report, unless a report
is not required under § 6AL.1." 429 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
defendant's argument, stating "[allthough that guideline, in some
circumstances, may require the court to defer its decision whether or not
to accept the plea agreement until after having considered the presen-

420. Id. at 761.
421. 204 F.3d at 1356.
422. Id.

423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. 209 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000).
428. Id. at 1296.

429. U.S.S.G. §6B1.1(c) (2000).
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tence report, it does not say that the court must defer its decision
430
whether to accept the plea until that time."
IX.

CHAPTER SEVEN: VIOLATIONS OF PROBATION AND SUPERVISED
RELEASE

In United States v. Brown, 431 the district court sentenced defendant
to twenty-four months in prison on a violation of supervised release so
that defendant could be housed in a comprehensive substance abuse
treatment program. The court further directed that if such a treatment
program was nu6 available, defendant would not serve more than eleven
months. The defendant appealed, contending that the district court
abused its discretion in departing from the policy statements for
violations of supervised release by imposing a twenty-four month
sentence for the specific purpose of rehabilitation.432 In affirming the
sentence, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that a district court "cannot
impose an initial incarcerative sentence for the purpose of providing a
defendant with rehabilitative treatment."433 The court held, however,
that the district court may consider a defendant's rehabilitative needs
when imposing a sentence following a term of supervised release.434
Defendant in Brown also argued that the district court failed to
consider the policy statements of Chapter Seven of the guidelines, which
provided for a range of five to eleven months. 4 5 The Eleventh Circuit
held that it was clear from the record that the sentencing court did
consider the sentencing range because it noted the minimum and
maximum advisory range during the sentencing hearing. 43 Thus, the
court did not abuse its discretion by exceeding the range and sentencing
defendant to the maximum penalty of twenty-four months in prison.437
435
In United States v. Aguillard,
the Eleventh Circuit dealt with two
issues pertaining to a sentence imposed upon a violation of supervised

430. 209 F.3d at 1296 (emphasis in original). The court also rejected defendant's
challenge to his guilty plea due to the district court's failure to advise him that his
sentence would be enhanced under U.S.S.G. section 2J1.7, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 3147. Id.
at 1295. The court noted that "the failure to advise of a Sentencing Guidelines sentencing
range is harmless error, as long as the defendant knew that the Sentencing Guidelines
existed and that they would affect his sentence." Id.
431. 224 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000).
432. Id. at 1239.
433. Id. at 1240.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 1242.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 1242-43.
438. 217 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2000).
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release. Defendant violated her supervised release and was sentenced
to twenty-four months imprisonment, which Was the statutory maximum
term of imprisonment upon revocation of the supervised release term.
Defendant first argued that the two-year term of imprisonment was too
severe and that the district court did not properly consider the nonbinding policy statements of Chapter Seven, which indicated a three- to ninemonth range of imprisonment would have been appropriate. 439 The
Eleventh Circuit reiterated that Chapter Seven guidelines are "merely
advisory" and that the district court need only be aware of them and
consider them when imposing a sentence.440 Because the district court
clearly mentioned the advisory guidelines and determined that they were
inadequate under the circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit found it had
sufficiently considered the guidelines before imposing the maximum
statutory sentence.44 1
Defendant in Aguillard also argued that the district court erred in
basing the length of the sentence on the prospects of her receiving drug
rehabilitation. 442 Because defendant failed to object at sentencing, the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed this issue only for plain error.443 The court
held that in light of the fact that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Eleventh Circuit had ever resolved the issue, plain error could not
exist.4' Nonetheless, in affirming the sentence, the court also noted
that the six circuits that had decided the issue had agreed it was not
improper to consider the availability of rehabilitative programs in
determining the length of the sentence upon a revocation of supervised
release.4 45
In United States v. Wiggins,446 the Eleventh Circuit was confronted
with the same issue as was presented in Aguillard. The district court
revoked defendant's supervised release and imposed a two-year sentence
for the sole purpose of insuring defendant would undergo comprehensive
drug abuse rehabilitation treatment. However, unlike the defendant in

439.

Id. at 1320.

440. Id. (quoting United States v. Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357, 361 (11th Cir. 1996)).
441. Id.
442.

Id. at 1321.

443. Id. at 1320.
444.

Id.

445. Id. The six cases cited by the Eleventh Circuit are: United States v. Anderson,
15 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. McGee, 85 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.Harlow, 124 F.3d

205 (7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); United States v. Shaw, 180 F.3d 920 (8th
Cir. 1999).
446. 220 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Aguillard, who had failed to object in the district court and was subject
to the plain error standard of review, defendant in Wiggins preserved
the issue in the district court.447 Therefore, his sentence was reviewed
for abuse of discretion."' Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit reached
the same conclusion as it had in Aguillard, holding that "the district
court did not abuse its discretion in considering the availability of drug
treatment in imposing a sentence exceeding that recommended by
Chapter Seven of the Guidelines."449
X.

CONCLUSION

The decline in published Eleventh Circuit opinions addressing
sentencing guideline issues in 2000 is likely an aberration that will not
recur in 2001, especially given the number of guideline amendments that
were enacted on November 1, 2000, and the evolving law applying
Apprendi. It will be interesting to watch the Supreme Court's reaction
to the cases that hold the guidelines in general are unaffected by
Apprendi." ° Although the majority opinion in Apprendi stated that
the guidelines were not before the court,4 ' the concurrence and dissent
clearly indicate that the rule announced by the majority may one day
result in the invalidation of the federal sentencing guidelines.452

447. Id. at 1248-49.
448. Id. at 1249.
449. Id.
450. See, e.g., Nealy, 232 F.3d at 829 n.3.
451. 530 U.S. at 497 n.21.
452. Id. at 523 n.11 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).

